Tibet is located in southwest China. The people living there had established links with the Han dynasty in the Middle Plains long before the Christian era. Over the centuries, several tribes scattered across the Qinghai-Tibet Plateau gradually developed into the Tibetan ethnic group.
History of Tibet in China – History of Tibet, know what is the reason for the dispute between China and Tibet
By the Tang dynasty (618–907 AD), Tibetans and Han strengthened unity and political friendship, and maintained close economic and cultural ties, through matrimonial ties between royal families and other alliances. This laid a solid foundation for the eventual establishment of a unified nation.
A statue of the Tang princess Wencheng, who married the Tubo king Songtsan Gambo in 641 AD, is still installed and worshiped at the Potala Palace in Lhasa, the capital of the Tibet Autonomous Region.
The Tang-Tubo Alliance Monument, which depicts the meeting between Tang and Tubo and was built in AD 823, still stands in the square in front of Jokhang Monastery. The inscription part of the monument reads: “Two kings like uncle and nephew, having come to an agreement that their territories would be united as one, have signed this alliance of great peace to last for eternity! May God and humanity be a witness to it, that he may be praised from generation to generation.”
In the mid-13th century, Tibet was officially included in the territory of the Yuan Dynasty of China. Since then, although China has experienced many dynastic changes, Tibet has been under the jurisdiction of China’s central government.
Yuan Dynasty (1271-1368)
The Yuan Emperor established the Xuanzhengyuan, or Ministry for the Diffusion of Rule, to directly handle important military and political matters relating to the Tibet region. The emperor selected people to work for the ministry, and its reports were submitted directly to the emperor.
The central government of the Yuan Dynasty sent officials to Tibet to establish post stations, which varied in size according to local population, topography and resources. These stations were connected in a communication line extending from Tibet to Dadu (present-day Beijing).
Ming Dynasty (1368-1644)
In 1368, the Ming dynasty replaced the Yuan dynasty in China and inherited the right to rule Tibet.
The central government of the Ming dynasty retained most of the titles and ranks of official positions established during the Yuan dynasty. The Dabus-Gtsang Nomad High Command was established in the central part of present-day Tibet, while the Mado-Khams Yatra High Command covered the eastern part. Equivalent to provincial-level military organs, they functioned under the Shaanxi Nomadic High Command and, at the same time, handled civil administration. In Nagari, western Tibet, the E-li-si Army-Civilian Marshal Office was established. The chief officers of these organs were appointed by the central government.
Any official of the Tibetan local government who violated the law was punished by the central government.
The Dalai Lama and the Banken Lama are the two major incarnation hierarchs of the Gelug sect of Tibetan Buddhism. The Gelug sect arose during the Ming dynasty, and the Third Dalai Lama was the abbot of one of the sect’s monasteries. The central government of the Ming dynasty did him a special favor by allowing him to pay tribute. In 1587, he was given the title of Dorzhichang or Vajradhara Dalai Lama.
Qing Dynasty (1644–1911)
When the Qing dynasty replaced the Ming dynasty in 1644, it strengthened the administration of Tibet. In 1653, the Qing emperor granted the fifth Dalai Lama an honorific title, and then did the same for the fifth Banken Lama in 1713, officially establishing the titles of the Dalai Lama and Banken Erden and their political and religious status in Tibet. .
The Dalai Lama ruled most of the region from Lhasa, while Banken Erdeni ruled the rest of Tibet from Zigaz.
In 1719, Qing government troops were sent to Tibet to repel the Zungar forces, which had been held in Lhasa for three years, and set out to reform Tibet’s administrative system. The Qing emperor made a young living Buddha from the Xicang region the seventh Dalai Lama and took him to Tibet. He named four Tibetan officials known as “galoins” for their meritorious service in handling the political affairs of Tibet.
From 1727, high commissioners were stationed in Tibet to oversee local administration on behalf of the central authorities. Officials were also assigned about this time to survey and delineate the borders between Tibet (known as Xizang in Chinese) and Sichuan, Yunnan and Qinghai. The Qing government had the power to confirm the reincarnation of all dead living Buddhas in Tibet, including the Dalai Lama and Banken Erden.
When the reincarnated boy was found, his name was written on a lot, which was put in a gold urn given by the central government.
The High Commissioner will bring together suitable high-ranking living Buddhas to determine the authenticity of the reincarnated boy, taking out the lot from the gold urn. (Both the urn and the lot are still preserved in Lhasa.)
The shaving of the incarnate living Buddha, his religious name, the choice of the guru to initiate him into sannyasa and his sutra instructor were all to be announced at the royal court for examination and approval by the high commissioners. The central government will send high officials to oversee the installation ceremony for the new Dalai Lama and the new Banken Erdeni and also oversee the ceremony to assume the reins of the government when he grows up.
Republic of China (1912–49)
In the autumn of 1911, a revolution broke out in the interior of China, overthrowing the Qing dynasty’s 270-year-old rule and establishing the Republic of China.
After its founding, the Republic of China declared itself to be a unified republic of Han, Manchu, Mongol, Hui, Tibetan and other ethnic groups. In his opening statement on January 1, 1912, Sun Yat-sen, the provisional first President of the Republic of China, declared in his address to the world: “The foundation of the country is in the people, and the unification of the lands inhabited by the Han, Manchu. The integration of the Han, Manchu, Mongol, Hui and Tibetan peoples into one country, the Mongol, Hui and Tibetan people, is called national integration.
In March, the Nanjing-based Provisional Senate of the Republic of China promulgated the first constitution of the republic, the Provisional Constitution of the Republic of China, which explicitly stipulated that Tibet was a part of the territory of the Republic of China.
When the Chinese Kuomintang formed the national government in Nanjing in 1927 and organized the national assembly in 1931, both the 13th Dalai Lama and the ninth Bainken Erdeni sent delegates.
Following the establishment of the Nanjing National Government, a Commission for Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs was established in 1929 to handle the administrative affairs of Tibetans, Mongolians and other ethnic minorities.
Despite the fact that frequent foreign invasions and civil wars undermined the central government of the Republic of China, it continued to give honorable titles to the Dalai Lama and Banken Erdeni. On several occasions the Dalai Lama and Banken Erdeni expressed their support for national integration and the central government.
The death of the 13th Dalai Lama in December 1933 was traditionally reported to the central government by the Tibetan local government. The national government sent a special envoy to Tibet for the memorial ceremony.
The local Tibetan government also followed a centuries-old system of reporting to the central government all procedures that must be followed in the search for the reincarnation of the 13th Dalai Lama.
The current 14th Dalai Lama was born in Qinghai Province. Originally named Lhamo Tonzhub, he was cast as one of the Avatar boys at the age of 2. After receiving a report submitted by the local Tibetan government in 1939, the central government ordered the Qinghai authorities to send troops to take them to Lhasa.
Following an inspection visit to Lhasa by Wu Zhongxin, the head of the Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission in 1940, Chiang Kai-shek, the then head of the central government, approved Tibetan Regent Razheng’s request to waive the lot-drawing convention, and the national The chairman of the government issued an official decree conferring the title of 14th Dalai Lama to Lhamo Tonzhub.
People’s Republic of China
The People’s Republic of China was established in 1949. In January 1950, the central government formally notified Tibet’s local authorities to “send representatives to Beijing to negotiate for the peaceful liberation of Tibet”.
The central government’s adherence to the policy of peaceful dialogue gave great support and inspiration to the patriotic forces in Tibet.
On May 23, 1951, following the Central People’s Government and the Tibetan People’s Representatives on the Agreement (also known as the 17-Article Agreement) of the Local Government of Tibet on Measures for the Peaceful Liberation of Tibet was signed. The local government agreed on a series of questions related to the peaceful liberation of Tibet.
The local Tibetan government convened a conference of all religious and secular officials and representatives of the three most prominent monasteries to discuss the agreement between 26 and 29 September 1951. At the end of the conference a report was approved to the Dalai Lama.
Conflict in Tibet: Main Causes and Possible Solutions
In March 2008, Tibet, known for its deeply religious and peaceful Buddhist people, led to widespread protests throughout the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR) as well as ethnic Tibetan areas of neighboring provinces. Some of these protests were peaceful, but others turned into riots and violence – including the burning and looting of shops owned by the Han Chinese, China’s majority ethnic group. “When violent riots broke out in Lhasa, the capital of Tibet on March 14, 2008, after four days of peaceful protests, Chinese-owned businesses were looted and burned. At least 19 people were killed, most of them Han were Chinese.” The Chinese government’s response to protests and riots throughout Tibet was swift and extreme. By some estimates, the march’s protests resulted in the deaths of more than 100 “unarmed” Tibetans – many of them Buddhist monks.
Trying to understand Tibetan public outrage, this article will begin by describing some recent events in Tibetan and Chinese history. In 1950, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the victor of the 1949 Chinese Civil War, launched an invasion of Tibet. From the point of view of Tibet, this invasion hindered independent nationality for centuries. Meanwhile, the Chinese believed they were establishing control over part of their sovereign territory that had been taken away from them during the foreign imperialism and civil war of the last century.
Later, the 1959 Tibetan uprising—partly nonviolent, partly violent, and largely inspired and led by the CIA, was violently crushed by the Chinese. Following these events, the Dalai Lama fled from Tibet for North India. The Dalai Lama, who has never returned to Tibet, and the Tibetan government in exile have been based in Dharamsala, India for the past half-century. The CCP created the TAR in 1965, nominally establishing Tibet’s regional autonomy; however, in practice, Tibetans enjoy minimally or zero autonomy, as Tibet’s politics, economics, and increasingly its culture is controlled by Beijing.
With this context in mind, this article will examine the causes of violent conflict in Tibet and provide some recommended solutions that could potentially lead to a more peaceful and equitable order in the region.
Main causes of conflict
The Sino-Tibetan conflict is often seen as an ethnic and/or religious conflict. This is understandable, given the prominence of ethnicity and religion in the conflict. First, while the native inhabitants of the Tibetan Plateau are Tibetans, the majority ethnic group in China is Han Chinese. The Chinese government is composed mostly of Han Chinese and does not have a strong record of treating China’s ethnic minorities – such as Tibetans – fairly.
Second, virtually all Tibetans are Buddhists, while ethnic Han Chinese generally are not, even though Chinese people are becoming increasingly religious – including Buddhists – now that the ideology of communism has collapsed in China (except in name only). . In addition, the Chinese government has a history of crushing religious movements, especially those that attract large numbers of adherents and which have the potential to transform into political movements that potentially threaten the regime’s hold on power. can put.
Tibetan Buddhism has such a following and transformative potential. For these reasons, headlines of the Tibet conflict often paint a picture of intense religious and ethnic conflict. Although these are aspects of the conflict, they are better described as their residual causes or consequences.
There is no underlying reason why ethnicity or religion should have led to violent conflict – in Tibet or anywhere else. Rather, the primary sources of conflict in Tibet are history and geography; Chinese security and sovereignty concerns; and the policies of the Chinese government in Tibet. While they focus on ethnic and religious differences between Tibetans and Chinese, these factors actually drive conflict in Tibet.
History and Geography of Tibet
First, history and differing views on whether Tibet has historically been an independent nation represent the main cause of the conflict. In the view of the Tibetan people, Tibet has been an independent nation – and sometimes a great empire – over the past several centuries. From this point of view, Mongolian rule over Tibet ended with the restoration of Tibet’s independence, and thereafter its relationship with China was not one of subjugation. Tibet remained independent until the Chinese invasion in 1950, which is therefore illegal.
The Chinese, on the other hand, believe that the historically great kingdom of Tibet declined greatly in the early 9th century and was then finally and completely brought down by the Mongols centuries earlier. Tibet then came under Chinese “dominance” in the 18th century, and it remained under Chinese administration until the late 19th century when Great Britain invaded Tibet, controlling Tibet as a buffer between China and British India. wanted to.
Furthermore, China argues that Britain envisioned an “independent Tibet” with the aim of creating a buffer between China and British India. China then reclaimed Tibet when Britain became engaged in an emerging Germany, and effectively gave Tibet back to China through the Treaty of 1907. China was finally able to establish control over Tibet in the mid-20th century, emerging from foreign imperialism and civil war.
These competing claims are still debated in academia and policy-making circles. However, Dickinson notes that “Tibetans, due to their lack of participation in the larger community during the first half of the twentieth century, their failure to participate in international organizations such as the League of Nations, and their failure to modernize Tibet during the Chinese occupation of 1950.” have been unable to make a convincing case to establish that it was an independent state.”
In fact, neither the United States nor any other major country considers Tibet independent; They all recognize Chinese sovereignty over Tibet. “As a result, China has been able to maintain its occupation and claim that Tibet was historically part of its territory, relying on other states not to interfere in its domestic affairs on grounds of territorial integrity.”
China’s concern about its security and sovereignty
Chinese concerns over their own security and sovereignty emerge as another main cause of conflict in Tibet. The Chinese see themselves as victims of foreign imperialism – especially during a century of humiliation, which remains fresh in their minds – and therefore feel they should take a hard line on issues of sovereignty in places like Tibet.
Eventually, if Tibet became independent, it could inspire similar succession movements in Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, and Taiwan. These regions not only form important border areas as well as buffers against foreign influence but are also centers of a sense of Chinese identity – which was devastated over the past two centuries, given China’s once proud, imperial past. Happened. In addition, China views the Dalai Lama, perhaps incorrectly, as a “divisionist”, which could lead to a “color revolution” across China.
US policies have not helped the situation so far. Along with the CIA’s role in Tibet in the 1950s and 1960s, George W. Bush’s administration’s anti-China policy (especially at the start of President Bush’s term) has reinforced fears of China’s sovereignty. Furthermore, recent US policies have not only failed to soften Chinese policy but have also prompted Tibetan exiles to support independence.
Because of this, the US crackdown on Tibet has added to China’s fears that the United States is trying to destabilize China. This reality undermines the position of Chinese people willing to work with Tibetans, strengthens hardliners, and does nothing to really help the Tibetan cause.
Another major cause of the Tibet conflict has been Chinese rule – and the “Sinicisation” – of the region. While the Chinese government claims it has successfully raised the standard of living in Tibet, many Tibetans inside and outside Tibet believe that the Chinese government’s “modernization” policies have damaged the region.
China claims that the $45.4 billion spent in TAR helped make the region’s 2003 GDP more than 28 times the 1978 GDP. According to Newsweek, for the past four years, GDP per capita has grown by 13% per year in rural Tibet, where 80-90% of TAR’s 3 million people live. As is the case with the rest of China, the CCP believes that the lack of political freedom is a small price to pay for such economic development.
The source of Tibetan frustration stems largely from the fact that while the standard of living in Tibet has improved, most of the gains have gone to the ethnic Han Chinese who have immigrated to Tibet. In addition, Han immigration – encouraged by the Chinese government through tax incentives – also, according to Tibetans, undermines Tibet’s political, religious, and cultural independence. Although the CCP opposes this allegation, Tibetan exiles claim that 60% of Lhasa is now Han ethnic.
Tibetans are also angered by the Chinese government’s intrusion into the political and cultural independence of their so-called autonomous region. Despite being officially a “governor” in Tibet, the de facto power rests with the Secretary of the Communist Party, who is a Han Chinese. At the same time, there is a serious problem with local government accountability as CCP officials do a poor job of reconciling the Chinese political system and Tibetan culture.
Because of this, the Tibetan way of life in terms of its religion, agriculture, and wildlife are under threat. The CCP places some restrictions on religious freedom, such as the number of monks allowed in a given monastery. The Chinese government’s preferred methods of farming have resulted in poor harvests and subsequent hunger, and according to some, famine. Finally, Tibet’s unique wildlife is threatened by poaching and hunting.
These issues form the root of tensions between Tibetans and the Chinese. To help resolve the violent conflict in Tibet, possible solutions – which will be discussed later – should be implemented by the following actors.
Intermediary Roles in Tibet
The primary parties in the Tibet conflict are the Chinese and Tibetans. The Chinese side includes the ethnic Han – the majority ethnic group in China – living in Tibet and the Chinese government. Tibetans can be further divided into those living in the TAR as well as its neighboring provinces versus Tibetan exiles living in northern India or elsewhere in the world.
Tibetans – both inside and outside China – can be divided into those who want to remain part of China, but with increased autonomy, and those who believe that Tibet should be an independent country. Some of the freedom seekers advocate non-violent means; Others promote the use of violence for Tibetan independence from Chinese rule.
No third party has played a consistent and active role in the mediation of the conflict. The United States acted as a willing second party during the 1950s and 1960s when the CIA was trying to destabilize a newly communist China. However, it has since lost interest in playing a concrete role, and the rest of the international community has been unable to put together a cohesive policy. However, third parties will be discussed later in the paper as an essential part of any resolution to the violent conflict in Tibet.
Here is a vision of a possible future Tibet. Tibet would be more autonomous, but still part of China and under its sovereignty. However, there will be more political self-determination in Tibet. Economic growth will continue, but in this way, only Tibetans will actually benefit, rather than the Han Chinese migrants from Tibet. In addition, these and other steps will help keep Tibetan culture intact. Gradually, such self-determination and better governance would be expanded to the ethnic Tibetan areas of neighboring provinces. Finally, through a long-term, incremental process, China – and therefore eventually Tibet – will one day become a liberal democracy.
The following are some of the actions that different parties to the conflict can take to bring about an appropriate resolution, as explained above.
What is the solution?
As always in a violent conflict, the first step should be reconciliation – in this case between the Tibetans and the Chinese. Of course, doing so is easier said than done. According to Lederach, relations between members of society should be reconstructed in a way that addresses the emotional and psychological issues of conflict. Furthermore, he says that this process should not only lead to the end of conflict and negative emotions but to create something new and positive. This process needs to happen at all three levels of society – elite, middle, and grassroots.
The middle level – which Lederach calls the most important level because it can connect the other two levels – can play an important role in Tibet. An example of this might be bringing together a Han practitioner with Buddhist leaders in Tibet, which could help reduce one of the main sources of tension. The religious leaders of Tibet feel that their religion and culture are being undermined by certain trade practices. Meanwhile, many Han business owners simply want to earn a living to support their families and/or help Tibetans develop their societies. Through relationship building, both parties may be able to find common ground and resolve their differences.
At the same time, the grassroots level in Tibet will be important, given that ordinary Tibetans and Chinese are largely divided by a lack of understanding of the other side’s point of view. While Tibetans feel denied suffrage in their own country, most Han Chinese are confused by the lack of “gratitude” for an honest and effective effort by their government to raise the living standards of Tibetans.
Nevertheless, while action must be taken at all three levels simultaneously, the nature of the Tibet conflict calls for a solution that is more focused at the elite level. This is partly due to the potentially transformative role of the Dalai Lama, the spiritual leader in exile in Tibet.
Role of Dalai Lama
The Dalai Lama will be at the heart of any peace-building process in Tibet. This is because he may be the only actor who can simultaneously reassure and soften hardliners in both the Chinese government and Tibet’s exile community.
Despite the Dalai Lama’s admiration around the world, the Chinese government does not trust him largely because of his links to highly pro-independence elements of the Chinese diaspora and its Western allies. They believe that their “middle way” approach to reform the conflict (“autonomy without independence”) not only in the TAR but also in “Greater Tibet” (the ethnically Tibetan areas of neighboring provinces) eventually led to independence. cover, which combined represent a quarter of China’s territory. To gain China’s trust, the Dalai Lama may need to distance itself from more extreme, pro-independence elements.
It would not represent an abdication of his mission to stand up for the rights of the Tibetan people. This is because most Tibetans actually living inside Tibet are interested in better governance and more freedom than they are in making risky attempts for outright independence. As evidence that the Dalai Lama could persuade Tibetans to submit to Chinese sovereignty, Thurman explains that when the Dalai Lama said that it was inhumane to kill animals for their fur, thousands of Tibetans voluntarily gave away the very valuable fur. to sacrifice.
When the Chinese government sees the Dalai Lama attempting to soften Tibetans’ views on the issue of independence, it will be more receptive to the idea of dialogue on issues such as governance reform in Tibet. Still, it can be difficult for both parties to take the necessary initial steps to move the process forward. For this reason, third-party mediators have an important role in the Tibet conflict.
Ideally, third-party intervention should be as internationalized as possible. This is especially true in a case like this one, where China has serious reservations – for historical reasons – about US intentions in the region. However, the United Nations is handicapped by China’s ability to veto resolutions.
Meanwhile, the West in general has been unable to reach a consensus on how to deal with China on the Tibet issue. Therefore, the United States will need to play a stronger role in bringing both sides to the table. Preliminary steps may be taken by second-tier actors, who would later become U.S. actors. and will set the stage for participation by Chinese governments and the Dalai Lama.
Some question the notion that regardless of who takes the lead in mediating the conflict, China will ever consider changing its behavior in Tibet. However, China has good reason to negotiate with the Tibetans. First, China recognizes how much it benefits from its participation in the international economy.
Furthermore, China’s efforts to protect its human rights record through white papers that adopt the language of the global human rights community show that it is not only concerned about its image but also responsive to international norms.
Secondly, according to Newsweek, the Chinese government is beginning to realize that its policies in Tibet – whether they have led to economic development or not – have failed to win over the hearts and minds of the Tibetan people. The CCP leadership may also be realizing that its harsh policies in Tibet are making China less secure, both internally and externally, by creating fear and anger among Tibetans and others around the world.
Through enlightened diplomacy, the United States must reinforce China’s beliefs on these matters. The United States should emphasize to China how it can take a major step toward becoming a responsible global power – with all the benefits – only by adopting policies in Tibet that are in its own best interest anyway.
In short, if the Dalai Lama is able to control the more extremist goals and activities of the Tibetan community in exile, he may be able to gain the trust of the Chinese government. Furthermore, through effective diplomacy, the United States may be able to take China to the negotiating table. Once this is complete, Tibetans and Chinese can begin working on the details of a potential peacebuilding framework. One of the first issues on the table should be the issue of Chinese rule in Tibet, which may be the primary cause of the escalating tensions.
According to Lederach, addressing economic and cultural concerns is critical to successful peace-building efforts. In Lederach’s book, Prendergast uses the Ethiopian case to show that feelings of marginalization and anger were reduced in areas where policies of poverty reduction and decentralization were implemented. Similarly, alleviating poverty in Tibetan society and the intervention of the CCP are central to improving the Tibet conflict.
While any peacebuilding framework should include Tibet with the rest of China, the Chinese government should do a better job of preserving Tibetan culture and assuring Tibetans benefit from the economic development being carried out in Tibet. Providing Tibet with more genuine self-determination should be the first step towards this goal.
First, Tibetans should be appointed as heads of all government and party offices in Tibet – including the party’s first secretary. As Tibetans gain more control over regional and local politics, they may also begin to exert greater influence over the program of economic modernization initiated by the CCP.
Currently, the modernization program benefits mostly Han Chinese expatriates rather than Tibetans. Solutions to this problem include eliminating tax incentives that attract Han migrants to Tibet and sending many of those who are already in Tibet back home. Exceptions can be made for Chinese workers and business owners who show a genuine interest in helping Tibet’s development, without diminishing Tibet’s culture; In addition, the Chinese government may divert some of the resources spent in Tibet to the provinces and villages these immigrants are leaving in search of better opportunities.
The modernization program is also weakening the Tibetan culture. Some steps should be taken to deal with this problem. First, the Tibetan language should be restored as the official language of the government and schools of Tibet. In addition, religious freedom – which has suffered under Chinese rule – must be increased. For example, the restriction on the number of monks allowed in a given monastery should be removed. Finally, threats to Tibet’s unique ecology and wildlife must be addressed through sustainable agricultural practices and enforced restrictions on poaching.
Power sharing and power division
Since Tibetans would need to work side by side in government with the Han Chinese, at least in the early stages of the peace-building process, “power sharing” could help reduce conflict between Tibetans and Chinese. According to Roeder and Rothschild, while the sharing of power does not lead to lasting peace and democratization, in the long run, it can help to “start the transition from conflict”. Sharing may be more successful, some of which may be applicable to the Tibet case.
Power sharing works best when, for example, the elite – once they have reached an agreement to end the violent conflict – have the power to prevent regular citizens from continuing to fight at the grassroots level. Has capacity. In China/Tibet, the CCP certainly has a significant capacity – which it uses on a daily basis – to control the behavior of its citizens through coercion and repression. Meanwhile, Tibetans are also very likely to abstain from violence if the Dalai Lama makes this request to them, although for various reasons – there is great admiration and respect for them.
The chances of a successful sharing of power also increase when the parties demonstrate a strong, sincere commitment to the agreement. While the CCP claims that the Dalai Lama is a “divisionist” who does not want independence and therefore cannot be trusted, there is reason to believe that the spiritual leader of Tibet means what he says.
The Dalai Lama points to his friendly visit to Taiwan, which also sees Tibet as an essential part of China, as evidence that it is not interested in independence. Furthermore, according to Newsweek, world leaders who have met the Dalai Lama have been convinced of his honesty in the matter. Despite this, there are powerful elements of the Tibet lobby that strongly support independence.
Power sharing, a proper short-term strategy, is risky in the long run. An alternative political system in Tibet may be a better option: the division of power. A power division system works to protect minority rights by establishing a system of checks and balances. As governance reforms in Tibet lead to an increase in the number of Tibetans holding real political power, the division of power can be used to reassure the apprehensive Han Chinese living in Tibet that their status as minorities’ Civil liberties and rights will be protected.
The division of power and emphasis on civil liberties, checks and balances, and protection of minority rights could also mark the first step towards the long-term goal of liberal democratization in China.
Gradual liberal democratization of China (and then Tibet)
According to Paris, while the process of democratization can be destabilizing for nations coming out of violent conflict, the Wilsonian goal of liberal democracy remains the best long-term goal for nations in transition. Because of China’s fear of succession and Western actors’ propensity for a “color revolution”, China’s democratization is not a policy that can be adopted in the short term – at least not openly.
western role of political affiliation and economic
Small, incremental steps through interdependence can help lead China to democracy, where ultimately the institutions that nurture democracy gradually develop. Then through this gradual, evolutionary process – in contrast to the destabilizing policy of rapid elections – China may one day develop into a liberal democracy. Furthermore, a liberal democratic China would be one that respects the political and human rights of its citizens, including Tibetans.
The Tibet issue remains a source of conflict and controversy in China and around the world. The divergent view of Tibetans and the Chinese government – in the context of the history of Tibet and the generosity of the Chinese regime there – makes it extremely difficult for even the most enlightened and committed mediator to resolve the impasse. In this paper, an attempt has been made to outline the steps that can be taken by the different sides of the conflict to find a just solution to the violent conflict in Tibet.
If this outcome is to be achieved, however, the United States and the rest of the international community must begin to treat the issue with the urgency it deserves. An escalation in the conflict between Tibet and China could not only cause great suffering among Tibetans but could put China on a collision course with the West – potentially leading to a new “Cold War” or even That there could also be a third world war.
Meanwhile, if the United States and its allies are able to help Tibetans and Chinese resolve their differences, not only can Tibetans enjoy peace and self-determination, but China can also become a responsible global power that Respects human rights and democratic values. ,